“A society’s . . . civilization is measured first and foremost by the position that women occupy in it.” – Jacques Chirac, 2003

While some have argued that civilization, defined by ethnicity, language, and religion, will be the engine of future world conflict (Huntington 1996), others have begun to make the case that a more fundamental cleavage between societies, represented by attitudes toward and beliefs about women, is a far more telling indicator of the potential for future conflict and instability among states (Inglehart and Norris 2003a). The geography and the psychology of gender status beliefs, reflected in practices, customs, and law, should have important political consequences, including consequences for nation-state security policy and conflict and cooperation between nation-states. As Caprioli (2004:255) puts it, “Feminist . . . scholarship ought to allow for an explanation of how women’s subordination or inequality has an impact on state behavior . . . If domestic inequality does affect state behavior . . . then policy prescriptions should be sought.”

Over the last two decades or so, various fields within the social sciences have profited by greater attention to gender. For example, the field of development was profoundly affected by the work of Ester Boserup, who argued that omission of gender aspects of development led to project failure (1970). Since that pioneering work, we have seen fruitful waves of successive research in the paradigms of Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), and Gender and Development (GAD) (Rathgeber 1990, Chen 1992, Jacobson 1992, Sen 1989, Choudery and Nair 2002), and the establishment of strong cross-national linkages between gender variables and variables such as national economic
performance (King, 2001). As a result of these efforts and evidences, regional and global development planners now routinely address the role of women in successful development. For example, the UN Millennium Goals include the goal of empowering women, and occasioned “Women Watch 2000” (later renamed The World’s Women), an effort to more closely monitor the status of women on a cross-national basis to formulate non-traditional indicators of development (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm). More recently, the Arab Development Report of 2002 identified the generally low status of women in Arab societies to be one of the four major variables retarding growth and advancement therein. The major studies in this field have in common the ability to show statistically significant links between the status of women and variables (in this case, economic development) defined at the nation-state level.

Turning to variables concerning national security, stability, and foreign policy behavior, however, the empirical literature becomes much more sparse. Nevertheless it is natural to ask, if the security and status of women significantly affect a state’s economic situation, do they also significantly affect a state’s internal and external security situation? Does the differing security and status of women among states affect their interaction?

Such provocative questions are only now beginning to be raised, and, interestingly, a major catalyst has been the events and sequelae of September 11th. For example, the Bush administration suggested that the abysmal condition of women under the Taliban regime provided both a partial explanation for the growth of terrorism there, as well as a partial rationale for the invasion of Afghanistan (2001). Some have proposed a direct link between terrorism and the treatment of women, suggesting that young men being brought up in isolation from women due to certain gender status beliefs, such as existed in Afghanistan under the Taliban, perpetuated an environment of extremism (Rashid, 2001). Laura Bush expressed in public the belief that, “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women . . . The brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists” (2001). The first post-invasion photos of Afghan girls going to school and Afghan women unveiling their faces were interpreted as tangible evidence that conditions were improving in that benighted land.

Since then, world attention has begun to more seriously inquire about the relationship between political violence and the status of women. These questions were first raised in
regards to Islam. States such as France have reacted with uncharacteristic fervor in banning
the Muslim headscarf from the heads of schoolgirls, seeing in the hijab some connection to
possible ethnic strife. The fracturing of Nigeria appears at first glance to be based on
religion, but women’s status could be the more fundamental issue. As Jan Jindy Pettman has
put it, “women are the boundary of the nation,” and what maintains or changes the status of
women may alter the situation of the state (1996). Observers are beginning to wonder
whether the rationalization of terrorism does not bear a significant parallel to the
rationalization of violence against and oppression of women. Jean Bethke Elshtain, for
example, asserts with reference to the differences between Western culture and radical
Islamic culture that, “we underestimate the centrality of the gender question at our peril . . .
[G]ender practices are not a sidebar to the war against terrorism as a cultural struggle, but a
central issue” (2003, 38, 40).

But the issue is much broader than that of Islamic culture. The first ‘Other’
encountered in life is most often a person of a different gender. How one’s society socializes
one to treat that first ‘Other’ may be the foundation of much social and political behavior in
the state. As philosopher Sylviane Agacinski puts it, “[I]t is always the difference of the
sexes that serves as a model for all other differences, and the male/female hierarchy that is
taken as a metaphor for all inter-ethnic hierarchies” (2001, 14). This metaphor may be
extended beyond a purely psychological construct of hierarchy, as well. The Geneva Center
for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces notes that there is a ‘hidden genocide’ of
women in the world, the toll of which is increasing, not decreasing, over time
(http://www.dcaf.ch/women/pb_women_ex_sum.pdf). In March 2006, Kofi Annan, then
Secretary General of the United Nations, stated, “The world is starting to grasp that there is
no policy more effective in promoting development, health and education than the
empowerment of women and girls. And I would venture that no policy is more important in
preventing conflict, or in achieving reconciliation after a conflict has ended.” The linkage
between women’s security and national security is clearly beginning to enter the public
imagination.

Research on Women and Security
Turning to variables concerning national security, stability, and foreign policy behavior, the empirical literature becomes much more sparse. Nevertheless it is natural to ask, if the security and status of women significantly affect a state’s economic situation, do they also significantly affect a state’s internal and external security situation? Does the differing security and status of women among states affect their interaction? Indeed the body of literature addressing the issue of women and security is growing, as academics and politicians alike turn their attention to gender relations as a linchpin of peace prior to (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2004; Caprioli & Boyer 2001; Caprioli & Trumbore; Regan & Paskeviciute, 2003) and post conflict (see Meintjes, Pillay and Tursher 2001; Mertus 2000), in addition to the need to include women in peace negotiations as codified in UN Resolution 1325 (Hunt and Poser 2001). Gender inequality is a barrier to peace and a harbinger of violence for both intra (Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005) and interstate violence (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003a,b, 2006; Regan & Paskeviciute, 2003).

In addition to scholars of international relations, comparativists following a postmodern tradition have also begun to look beyond the state toward gender relations specifically in advocating the need for a gendered perspective in the discipline of comparative politics (Beckwith & Baldez 2006; Tripp 2006; Weldon 2006) and in rethinking a feminist methodology within comparative politics (see Fonow 1991). Beyond political science, psychologists and geographers also analyze the issue of gender inequality. For example, within feminist geography there have been recent calls to link security at the state level to studies on security and fear among women in local spaces (Kofman 2005); to consider how gender roles in a variety of places and at a variety of scales help to shape political relationships at the state level (Staeheli and Kofman 2004); and to reconstruct geopolitics so that it promotes the well-being and security of persons (Hyndman 2001). In psychology, research on gender differences in conflict has produced some general and often contradictory trends. Researchers have found that boys experience conflict more frequently (Vespo & Caplan, 1993) and more violently than girls (Miller, Danaher, & Forbes, 1986). Other studies, however, indicated no differences in conflict frequency or duration in the conflicts of young children with regard to gender (O’Brien, Roy, Jacobs, Macaluso, & Peyton, 1999; Vespo & Pedersen, 1995). And yet, children and adolescents’ responses to
conflict differ along gender lines (Walker et al, 2003; Walker, Irving, & Berthelsen, 2002; Noakes & Rinaldi, 2006; O’Brien, Roy, Jacobs, Macaluso, & Peyton, 1999). This literature begs further investigation, including that of the relationship to state violence in cultures with rigid and highly differentiated gender roles.

In sum, then, it is time to ask whether the security of a state is linked to the situation and security of its women. It is also time to ask whether state behavior in international affairs is related to the situation of its women.

**Linking women and security**

The need for more comprehensive gender data to systematically identify the impact of gender on state behavior is further justified by existing research highlighting the insidious impact of gender equality. We offer five examples from the field of international relations, noting that there are other small literatures, which we do not survey, in comparative politics, geography, and psychology.

In a recent empirical analysis of Moslem societies, M. Steven Fish debunks the notion that Islamic societies are disproportionately involved in conflict or disproportionately suffer from authoritarian rule (2002). Rather, Fish uncovers two indicators that better explain the variance of these variables in the Islamic world: sex ratio and literacy gap between males and females. Fish finds that models incorporating these two variables are significantly correlated to authoritarianism in Islamic countries. He hypothesizes that the oppression of the female—one of the earliest social acts observed by all in the society—provides the template for other types of oppression, including authoritarianism.

Hudson and Den Boer (2004) similarly find that countries with exaggerated gender inequality—defined as highly abnormal sex ratios in favor of males—experience higher societal instability and diminished prospects for both peace and democracy. Using insights from both historical and sociological research, they demonstrate that the formation of a surplus of young adult males has been an aggravating factor in the creation of subversive criminal gangs engaged in violence and often in pursuit not only of greater wealth but also greater power vis a vis the central government. Governmental responses to this growing internal threat may alter the calculus of deterrence in a regional context and often lead to
heightened authoritarianism by the government, suggesting the existence of a relationship
between violence against women and violence within and between nations.

Empirical studies by Mary Caprioli and co-authors linking measures of domestic
gender inequality to state-level variables concerning conflict and security reveal important
and statistically significant relationships. Caprioli and Boyer (2001) show that states
exhibiting high levels of gender equality also exhibit lower levels of violence in international
crises and disputes. Examining aggregate data involving such cases over a fifty year period
(1954–94), statistically significant relationships between level of violence in crisis and
percent women in parliament and percent female leaders in crisis was found. Caprioli (2003)
extends this analysis to militarized interstate disputes, and finds a similar relationship: states
with the best gender equality displayed lower levels of aggression in these disputes, and were
less likely to use force first (see also Marshall and Ramsey, 1999). Virtually the same pattern
was found with respect to intrastate incidents of conflict (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005).
Caprioli suggests, “[S]cholars need to analyze the effects of inequality [of women] on the
state—specifically state behavior internationally . . . [D]omestic norms of violence inherent
in structural inequality transfer to the international arena just as domestic norms of peaceful
conflict resolution do” (265). Caprioli and Trumbore find that states characterized by norms
of gender and ethnic inequality as well as human rights abuses are more likely to become
involved in militarized interstate disputes and in violent interstate disputes (2006), to be the
aggressors during international disputes (2003a), and to rely on force when involved in an
international dispute (2003b). Sobek, Abouharb, and Ingram (2006) confirm Caprioli and
Trumbore’s findings that domestic norms centered on equality and the respect for human
rights reduces international conflict. In sum, the promotion of gender equality goes far
beyond the issue of social justice to being a necessary condition for international peace.

The research of McDermott and Cowden (2001) tackle that very issue of gender-
related norm transfer from the domestic to the international political arena. They utilize a
 technique more suitable to drawing out the psychological dimensions of this transfer: a
simulation of negotiations between nation-states that could escalate or de-escalate a crisis
situation through communication. The presence of women in the negotiations significantly
affected the outcome in terms of propensity to escalate or de-escalate. This study is
noteworthy for its inclusion of psychological variables to facilitate theoretical development
concerning how gender differences affect resulting political processes and outcomes (see also Florea et al. 2003).

Inglehart and Norris (2003a, 2003b), while not researching nation-state behavior per se, examine psychological attitudes toward women across ‘civilizations’ defined more traditionally in terms of religion or ethnicity. They find that, contrary to popular impression, beliefs about democracy and other political values are simply not very different between, say, Islamic and Christian cultures. However, beliefs about gender equality differ markedly, which they take to be evidence that conceptualization of culture, or nation-state, or civilization must be redefined to include a gender perspective. Furthermore, they find strong associations between psychological attitudes about women and indicators such as the percent of women elected to the national legislature.

The time is ripe—one might even say overdue—for a more systematic examination of the possible linkage between the status of women and the fate of their nations in terms of national security and foreign policy.

The Theoretical Framework Linking Women’s Equality with the Security and Behavior of States

Our theoretical framework rests in a foundational sense upon the work of French feminist philosopher Sylviane Agacinski and is also informed by the work of other scholars such as J. Ann Tickner, V. Spike Peterson, A. Don Sorensen, Martha Nussbaum, Seyla Benhabib, Susan Moller Okin, Jennifer Roback Morse, Johan Galtung, and others. Our most proximate source of theorizing is the work of Mary Caprioli (2005) an IR scholar who has most explicitly asked about the relationship between women’s status and national security.

These theorists have in common the argument that despite the many differing cultural conceptions of women and women’s lives, certain underlying aspects of their lives can be used to determine the security and status of a woman in her society, and that this status may be compared cross-nationally. Thus, according to Nussbaum (2001; see also 1995), observable variables such as highly abnormal sex ratios in favor of males, or denying girls the legal right or the access to education, can be applied cross-nationally to determine gender status beliefs and the security and status of women. Further, Agacinski argues that the ‘parity’ accorded the voices of the two sexes in society can also be used in a cross-national
fashion to assess the status of women; “beginning from its biological ‘anchoring,’ the masculine/feminine difference universally constitutes a model that structures societies, although the values and contents given to this difference vary according to the culture” (2001, 8). Implicit in these theoretical works is the assertion that the nation-state becomes dysfunctional in the presence of a low status for women, whether dysfunctionality be defined economically, politically, or in terms of physical health indicators.

Following Nussbaum’s lead, we are most interested in the following clusters of variables concerning the status of women:

1. Women’s Physical Security
2. Women’s Economic Security
3. Women’s Legal Security
4. Women’s Security in the Community
5. Women’s Security in the Family
6. Security for Maternity
7. Women’s Security Through Voice
8. Security Through Societal Investment in Women
9. Women’s Security in the State

The creation and maintenance of structural inequality in these Nussbaum-inspired categories is explained by Caprioli in this fashion (the following four paragraphs are adapted from 2005:165):

Gender, as an analytical category, captures the complex matrix of social relationships within society (Rosaldo, 1980; UNPFA, 2003). Although a hierarchy among women exists, gender stratification subsists across class and socioeconomic status. A gender hierarchy is established that ‘reinforces itself through an elaborate system of rules and punishments in all aspects of life’ (Grant 1993:161). Although gender roles change over time and are culturally dependent, gender is used as a benchmark to determine access and power, and is the rubric under which inequality is justified and maintained. Indeed, ‘Gender power is seen to shape the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena’ (Cockburn, 2001:15). This interaction includes economic, political, and social dynamics. The intrusion of gender inequality throughout all aspects of human interaction thus creates the foundation for structural inequality.

Just as domestic political norms drive international behavior (see Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1990), domestic norms of gender inequality results in higher levels of inter and
intrastate violence. (See Figure 1.) Societies with high levels of family violence are more likely to rely on violent conflict resolution and are more likely to be involved in wars than are societies with lower levels of family violence (Erchak 1994; Erchak and Rosenfeld 1994; Levinson 1989). Higher levels of societal violence occur “when political power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent upon one’s social group membership, be it race, religion, ethnicity, or some cultural division [gender], then collective violence is also highly likely” (Rummel 1997:170). Indeed, scholars have found a correlation between a state’s level of militarism and sexism, manifested by women’s inequality in relation to that of men (Elshtain 1987; Reardon 1985; Ruddick 1983; Brownmiller 1975). As Bradley and Khor (1993) argue, status emerges from social organization and culture provides a system of meaning that constructs social arrangements – the rules of the game. If the rules of the game are based on gendered structural inequality and violence at the state level, then violent international behavior is likely.

![Figure 1. Theoretical Framework Linking Violence Against Women to State-Level](image)

The following discussion of structural violence is adapted from Caprioli (2005). Both structural violence (Galtung, 1975) and cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) are key to understanding societal levels of violence, as they are the form the ideological justification for violence. The importance of state- and societal-level factors, including regime type, on the likelihood of war is supported by three decades of research (see Ray, 1995). According to
the democratic peace thesis as well as research by anthropologists in some two-dozen
‘peaceful societies,’ states apply the same domestic norms and behaviors in both domestic
and international settings (Bonta, 1996; Maoz, 2003). This proclivity toward international
peace in certain societies is based, in part, “on tolerance and a respect for the rights of
opponents” (Raymond, 2000:290). If norms of tolerance and respect have a pacifying impact
on domestic and international behavior, then norms of intolerance and inequality should have
an incendiary impact on domestic and international behavior by legitimizing violence as a
tool of conflict resolution. Just as liberalism condemns intolerance and coercion (Owen
1997:33), so does equality. Inequality creates the justification for advancing interests
through the use of force rather than persuasion. Indeed, “The only perpetual peace which can
be established among men is tolerance” (Voltaire 1769).

According to Galtung (1975), structural violence is understood as systematic
exploitation that becomes part of the social order. This systematic exploitation renders
personal violence unnecessary – “Personal violence is only for the amateur in dominance;
structural violence is the tool of the professional. The amateur who wants to dominate uses
guns, the professional uses social structure” (Galtung, 1975:80). Although Galtung focused
on structural violence in terms of economic inequality, his theory can readily be applied to
other forms of structural violence. Structural violence has four basic components:
exploitation which is focused on the division of labor with the benefits being asymmetrically
distributed, penetration which necessitates the control by the exploiters over the
consciousness of the exploited thus resulting in the acquiescence of the oppressed,
fragmentation which means that the exploited are separated from each other, and
marginalization with the exploiters as a privileged class with their own rules and form of
interaction (Galtung, 1975: 264–65).

In applying Galtung’s (1975:265) model of structural violence to women, we find all
four components of structural violence. In terms of exploitation, gender roles and
expectations lead “to highly differential possibilities for personal development.” The second
component, penetration, is closely related to exploitation “by providing a structure that
produces extreme differentials in development of consciousness.” Structural violence is
maintained through socialization, gender stereotyping, and a constant threat of violence, all
of which insidiously identify women as inferior. Third, fragmentation results from women
having fewer job opportunities outside the home that would allow for participation and create a sense of efficacy. Fragmentation also results from women having greater family responsibilities, thus minimizing leisure time that could otherwise be used to socialize, meet with other women, or to become politically active. And finally, “marginalization is the clear separation line between the two [in this case men and women], leaving no doubt as to who are first class and who are second class” (Galtung, 1975:265). Indeed, gendered hierarchies are indicative of “a set of social practices, beliefs, ideas, values and speech that promote male domination and superiority and female subordination and secondariness’ (Rowbotham 1983:27)” (Sideris, 2001:143).

Values identify desirable behaviors and alternatives and limit possibilities (Feather 1996). In other words, cultural norms impose rules that govern social behavior, separating legitimate from illegitimate behavior. Feather (2004) argues that power values, as inherent to structural inequality, are concerned with dominance, social power, and authority and finds a positive correlation between power values and hostile sexism, particularly among males. Furthermore, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) note that those who value power exhibit dominating behavior. Values, therefore, are crucial indicators of peace and violence. Indeed, peace and conflict resolution are based on worldviews of nonviolence – a relationship that goes beyond ideology to structures that reinforce these shared beliefs (Bonta 1996). A sustainable peace, therefore, is predicated on fostering fundamental societal changes that include gender equality (Hunt & Posa 2001).

Structural violence is created and sustained by cultural norms and is a process by which cultural violence is institutionalized. Indeed, Galtung (1990) highlights the role of cultural violence as part of the social matrix of violence that is used to both justify and legitimize structural violence. Norms of cultural violence can be found in religion, ideology, language, and art, among other aspects of culture. “Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong’” (Galtung, 1990:291). Although women have become active agents with notable success in the struggle for equality, violence remains a component of relations between men and women (Sideris, 2001) – an enduring aspect of cultural violence that underscores gendered structural violence. Multiple causes of violence against women exist, yet inequality of power (domination and subordination) is a common denominator in all acts of violence. It is this structural inequality
of power that “creates the conditions for the social control of women” (Sideris, 2001:142). Indeed, Henderson (2004) finds that women’s inequality creates a power vacuum that men in authority can and do exploit with repression.

Gender is an integral aspect of structural and cultural violence, for gender forms the basis of structural inequality in all states. Although the power and role of women vary across states, women have yet to gain full equality in any state. Of course structural hierarchies may also be based on race, religion, etc. Gender is, however, a cross-cultural foundation of structural inequality. When structural violence is minimized, societal tolerance of violence is decreased (Caprioli, 2003), thus leading to fewer international disputes and to fewer instances of intrastate violence (Caprioli, 2005). Conversely, when societal tolerance of violence is supported and legitimized by an environment of structural violence, the incidence of both inter- and intrastate violence should increase, for violence becomes a way of life and a valid tool for settling disputes.

These malignant norms of domination and subordination become enshrined in structural violence, which thrives on social conditions of exploitation, domination, repression, and discrimination (Ibeanu, 2001) and sustains a worldview that is competitive rather than cooperative (Schwartz, 1996). Inequality, when extreme and systematic, leads to political violence (Midlarsky, 1999). In other words, norms of equality facilitate cooperation among groups who are then more likely to rely on influence or persuasion, rather than on violence (Ross, 2000). Norms of inequality—cultural violence—create intransigence.

The link between inequality and violence and more specifically between gendered inequality and violence leads UNESCO (1995) to conclude that inequality between men and women is an impediment to sustainable peace. In other words, achieving peace necessitates “overcoming social relations of domination and subordination” (Tickner, 1992:128). Gendered structural hierarchies, which are maintained by norms of violence and oppression, should result in higher levels of inter- and intrastate violence by inuring people to violence and by providing the framework for justifying violence. Gendered hierarchies have an additional role in explaining the violence attendant to nationalism, for the dichotomy between men and women that underscores structural inequality and violence is also an integral aspect of nationalism. Clearly nationalism is not gender neutral. Dichotomizing the sexes becomes one of many ways of creating in- and out-group both within and between
groups. “Gender relations are a crucial, not peripheral, dimension of the dynamics of groups identities and intergroup conflicts” (Peterson, 1998:42-43). There is an inherent nationalist antipathy toward feminist goals, for men are considered the guardians of culture and tradition and any reforms to the cultural distribution of power are viewed as a threat to nationalist efforts to protect or unify the community (Tickner, 1992, 2001; Papanek, 1994; Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Gendered nationalism, therefore, relies on dichotomous gender roles, thus bolstering structural inequality and violence between and within nations. Conversely, the prior existence of equality hampers the ability to mobilize through demoralizing women. Women’s domestic equality would then result in fewer incidences of international and domestic conflict (Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli, 2000, 2003, 2005). In sum, the higher the level of gender inequality, the greater the likelihood of international and domestic conflict and instability for the nation.

To extend this line of research concerning the linkage between women and state security and behavior, we will need a wide variety of detailed indices on the situation and status of women. Can these be constructed?

**Country Specific Data on Women, or the Lack Thereof**

As scholars and politicians start to recognize the importance of gender equality to political and economic stability as well as peace, indices on gender equality have become more important. Due to a lack of data, most scholars have relied on one or more single indicator indicators to measure women’s status. In an informal survey of the existing empirical literature, the overwhelming majority of gender variables used in cross-national empirical analysis came from the following limited list: female representation in parliament, female literacy rates, female enrollment in education, female life expectancy, female representation in the formal economy, and female suffrage. These are excellent indicators, to be sure, but even taken as a whole do not capture the nuanced differences of women’s status across nations. More specifically, the existing measures of gender equality typically rely on participation in the formal political and economic systems without determining the ability to exercise power. For example, women may serve as token members of parliament and be assigned to weak committees thus limiting their actual power and equality. On the other hand, the percentage of women may not reach the 30 percent threshold identified by the UN.
Commission on the Status of Women as the minimum percentage to influence policy. This leads to two related issues: a high percent of women in parliament without the ability to actualize power is misleading, and a high level of percent women in parliament relative to other states becomes a moot point if the percentages do not meet or exceed thirty. Furthermore, women elected to office are often recruited from the upper classes and as such, their formal political position is not a reflection of women’s equality in general. Other irregularities may be occurring: there is a quota for female representation in Pakistan, but it was recently discovered that dead women were winning elections (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4283822.stm).

The same problems exist in relation to other oft-used variables: percent women in the labor force in that women may not be able to control their wealth, have limited career choices, and be paid less than men. Although female suffrage provides a gross indication of political gender equality, women are often unable to exercise that right for a variety of reasons. Literacy rates and enrollment in education are equally fallible when that literacy or education cannot be put to good use such as having career opportunities available. Although both literacy and education have been linked to female empowerment and to lower fertility rates, this association is tenuous when men control access to and can deny use of birth control. In addition to such general theoretical issues surrounding indicators of women’s status, there are also practical issues, as well. For example, some states experience significant subnational variation in the status of women, which vanishes when only national indicators are used. The state of Kerala in India, for instance, has significantly higher female life expectancy figures than other Indian states such as the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. Rates of female circumcision differ greatly according to region in nations such as Tanzania. Still other practical concerns include the often stark divergence between what is legal and what is widely practiced in society, the most prominent example being noteworthy rates of female infanticide and selective female fetus abortion in nations such as China and India, where both practices are strictly illegal.

Beyond single indicator measures, there have been some attempts to create indices of women’s status. Two of these indices developed in 1995 are the United Nations’ Development Programme Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and the Gender Development Index (GDI). These indices, however, are not without fault. GEM is a
composite index of women’s percentage share of administrative and managerial positions; women’s percentage share of professional and technical jobs; and women’s percentage share of parliamentary seats. GEM was created in an attempt to measure the relative power of women and men in political and economic life, and GDI was created as a gender sensitive measure of the human development index – longevity (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy rate, and combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio), and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita in purchasing power parity US dollars).

(UNDP)

Thus GEM attempts to capture women’s political, economic, and social participation; whereas, GDI measures the average achievement of a country in basic human capabilities for both men and women. Charmes and Wieringa (2003) provide a thorough critique of both GEM and GDI. In particular they address two problems related to issues of validity based on the indices dependence on GDP and the limited conceptualization of gender, and of reliability concerning the individual measures that comprise the index. Charmes and Wieringa (2003) argue that GDI is not exclusively a measure of gender inequality but rather of general welfare because GDI also includes the absolute level of well-being. As Moez (1997) points out, GDI decreases when achievement levels of both men and women decrease and when the difference in their level of achievement increases.

Charmes and Wieringa (2003) condemn GEM for its shortcomings as a measure of gender equality in part because absolute levels of income, rather than gender sensitive levels, influence the income component of GEM. Furthermore, Charmes and Wieringa (2003) criticize GEM for failing to incorporate issues related to the body and sexuality; to religious, cultural, and legal issues; to ethics, women’s rights, and care. In highlighting an additional bias within GEM, Pillarisetti and McGillivray (1998) criticize GEM for failing to capture power over resources particularly in states with small organized manufacturing sectors as found in many developing countries or variations within the state.

The inadequacies of GEM and GDI lead Charmes and Wieringa (2003) to conclude: The limited extent in which the GEM (and the GDI) manage to capture the relevance of gender ideology, and the workings of the gendered nature of power revealed in the empowerment matrix, is provided by the example of Barbados. This Caribbean island has the highest ratings of all developing countries (on the GDI, it is in place 11; its
GEM ranking is 12); it is even performing better than the UK, Switzerland, Japan and France. Yet, as Barriteau (undated) concludes, these ratings “have not altered gender ideologies that view women as subordinate to men and that have become overtly misogynist” (p. 20). Women’s advances in education and work are seen by men as the reasons for the poor performance of boys in schools and other problems men face, giving rise to a wave of misogyny. Also, as elsewhere, women are the majority of the poor, and women’s unemployment rates are higher than men’s. (433)

In addition to GEM and GDI, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2006) provides three indices of women’s rights. These include women’s political rights, women’s economic rights, and women’s social rights. The indices are four-level ordinal scales, which preferably should have odd numbers of categories to provide a natural conceptual ‘mid-point’ in the scale. Unfortunately, the CIRI gender indicators are not reliable measures of women’s rights and the measures are not sensitive to variations within the state particularly in terms of social limitations. The women’s political rights index relies on some of the single indicator variables listed above particularly on percentage of women in the legislature and in other high-ranking government and therefore, suffers from the same shortcomings. Although the coding for women’s political rights mentions limitations in practice, the decision rules do not.

From a gender equality standpoint, the CIRI index for women’s economic rights is equally problematic, for it relies on the existence and enforcement of laws pertaining to women’s economic rights. As with CIRI women’s political rights index, the women’s economic rights index fails to capture social pressure and ignorance that can prevent women from attempting to apply for positions within the formal labor sector, thus remaining an invisible discrimination that never triggers a state response to laws should they exist.

The coding scheme for the CIRI women’s social rights index is most troubling. Specifically, the rules instruct coders to “Ignore any mention in the USSD reports of domestic violence, trafficking and prostitution, sexual harassment, honor killings, dowry deaths, and rape” (http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/web_version_7_31_04_ciri_coding_guide.pdf). In other words, women might be routinely violated in any number of ways that could include murder, and yet this would not be factored into the CIRI index for women’s social rights. As with the CIRI women’s economic rights index, women’s social rights focuses on the
existence and enforcement of laws pertaining to social rights, the prevalence of domestic violence, trafficking and prostitution, sexual harassment, honor killings, dowry deaths, and rape notwithstanding. Specifically, the social index includes the right to travel abroad and the right to an education among other rights. As with economic and political rights women might not be aware of these rights or be constrained from exercising them, or access to these rights might vary by region, ethnicity or other factors.

Perhaps most damning is CIRI’s reliance on the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. In particular NGO Monitor argues that the statistics in the Country Reports are based on information provided by NGO’s, most of which have no independent research capability, are unable or unwilling to document allegations for verification, accept and rely heavily on politically motivated claims and anecdotal information, and selectively discriminate between sources based not on credibility but on political agendas. http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article.php?id=303

A reliance on NGO’s such has Amnesty undermines the objectivity of the Country Reports. Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz relates his communication with Amnesty International’s researcher for Israel and the Occupied Territories in 2005 when he asked for the data on which Amnesty concluded “that violence against women had escalated to an ‘unprecedented level’ during the occupation” and “whether AI had compared violence against women in the occupied West Bank and Gaza with violence against women in unoccupied Arab-Muslim areas that have comparable populations, such as Jordan. Rovera acknowledged that AI could provide no such comparative data and confirmed that the report was based on anecdotal information, primarily from Palestinian NGOs” (Dershowitz 2005). Dershowitz argues that it is impossible to replicate or refute Amnesty’s conclusions.

The UK’s Immigration Advisory Service (IAS) in a June 9, 2004 report is equally condemning of US Country Reports arguing that they do not provide sources and rely heavily on primary and secondary sources. The Country Reports are more accurate for some countries than for others because the reports rely on embassy and other organizational contacts with “human rights organizations, public advocates for victims, and others fighting for human freedom in every country and every region of the world” (US Country Reports Preface). The IAS argues that
US Government awareness of the situation on the ground in countries where they have no embassy is questionable. For example, the US had no presence in Iraq from 1991-2003. Their intelligence was based therefore not on embassy sources as cited above, but on satellite photos and the word of dissidents. The debate over the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has made it amply clear that information from these latter sources is far from reliable. Particular care should therefore be taken when using these reports to reflect the current situation in DR Congo, Iran, Somalia and Sudan which do not have a US embassy.

Furthermore, the US Department of State is not itself free from political bias or opinion. It has been criticised by both the US-based organisation Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch for the lack of objectivity in its reports concerning countries in which it has a politically sensitive stance. This would certainly apply to Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, and Uzbekistan.

Given these criticisms of the US Country Reports, any data relying on the Country Reports is suspect. Thus the accuracy of CIRI data is questionable particularly in relation to women, for its focus on the public sphere to the exclusion of the private sphere prevents it from capturing women’s equality or their daily reality. CIRI should, however, be commended for its attempt to provide gender relative measures and does seem to provide an adequate measure, if researchers recognize and correct for source bias, of government human rights practices.

Clearly researchers seeking to study the impact of gender inequality on state behavior are faced with a dearth of reliable data. We seek to fill that void. As described below, we provide a transparent database with all data available. WomanStats recognizes the need to account for both the private and public aspects of various dimensions of status (Balk 1994; Bradley and Khor 1993). And WomanStats provides the data that others have advocated using in lieu of GEM and GDI. Specifically, WomanStats has data on infant and child mortality rates, which Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000) argue are better able to capture gender differences in health conditions. In their critique of UNDP measures, Bardhan and Klasen (1999) bemoan the underestimation of ‘missing women’ in the GDI and the GEM – here, too, WomanStats includes this data.
The WomanStats Database

Because of the data availability problems discussed in the previous section, we have come to the conclusion that one major contribution that we could make to our colleagues, and also the world community, would be to assemble in one database as many indicators related to our nine conceptual facets of women’s status as could be identified. Furthermore, we not only wish to assemble that data for every nation-state, but also to include subnational data regarding the practices of different regions and/or groups.

In the October 2006 report to the United Nations General Assembly on violence against women, it is noted that knowledge base problems are one of the most important issues that must be solved in order for such violence to be properly addressed. Here are some pertinent points from that report:

Despite the progress in recent years, however, there is still an urgent need to strengthen the knowledge base on all forms of violence against women to inform policy and strategy development. Many countries still lack reliable data and much of the existing information cannot be meaningfully compared. Moreover, very few countries collect data on violence against women on a regular basis, which would allow changes over time to be measured. More data are urgently needed on how various forms of violence against women affect different groups of women, requiring that data be disaggregated according to factors such as age and ethnicity. Little information is available to assess the measures taken to combat violence against women and to evaluate their impact. Both policymakers and activists have called for the development of a comprehensive set of international indicators on violence against women. These international indicators would need to be based on widely available and credible data collected at the national level, using comparable methods to define and measure violence . . . More and better quality data are needed to guide national policies and programmes and to monitor States’ progress in addressing violence. Ensuring an adequate knowledge base through data collection is part of every State’s obligation to address violence against women. States should take responsibility for the systematic collection and publication of data under the framework of official statistics, including supporting NGOs, academics and others engaged in such work. (UN VAW, October 2006)
WomanStats goes a long way towards addressing these problems noted by the United Nations, and does so not only for issues of violence against women, but for a range of issues including social, legal, economic, physical security and health, and others. Using Nussbaum’s cross-national framework as a reference point (Nussbaum 2001; see also 1995), we collect variables pertaining to the following nine theoretical clusters of interest:

1. Women’s Physical Security
2. Women’s Economic Security
3. Women’s Legal Security
4. Women’s Security in the Community
5. Women’s Security in the Family
6. Security for Maternity
7. Women’s Security Through Voice
8. Security Through Societal Investment in Women
9. Women’s Security in the State

The logistics of this endeavor are formidable, requiring us to create a dataset spreadsheet into which information from the disparate data sources can be entered, as well as a codebook to inform those who collect and those who use the data. Standards of coding particular variables and inter-coder reliability, as well as standards for reporting the sources from which the data was derived, had to be established. This took an immense amount of effort, but that spreadsheet and codebook now exist. Taken together, variables under each of the nine conceptual clusters concerning women’s status noted above total approximately 240 for each of 171 countries (those countries with populations greater than 200,000) and their attendant subnational divisions, for a total of almost 41,040 individual data points. Inter-coder reliability checks average over 80%.

Realizing the frequent discrepancy between rhetoric, law, and practice, we seek data on three aspects of each variable—law, practice/custom, and data—we are able to provide a richer data source for researchers unhappy with relatively superficial indicators. For example, when examining the phenomenon of rape, we collect data not only on the incidence of rape and laws concerning rape, but also custom and practice concerning rape. So, for example, are rapes generally reported? Why or why not? Is a woman who had been raped typically subject to reprisal by her family or clan? Is she eligible for marriage? Is rape of the wife grounds for divorce by the husband? Is rape sometimes sanctioned, as in the practice of capture marriage, etc.? How does a woman prove rape in a court of law in her country? Are
there other barriers to enforcement of the law, such as low conviction rates? In the WomanStats database, there are eleven variables on rape alone.

One of the strengths of our effort is that we are consulting sources, including country experts, that are not already included in the major data sets such as Wistat, CEDAW, and the State Department’s Human Rights Reports. We also extract information from non-official sources as well, such as the important Shadow CEDAWs produced by various non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, we are inputting not only statistics, but qualitative data as well, to give voice to the experiences of real women in the context of their culture. An immense amount of work has already taken place: for example, over 15,000 pages of CEDAW reports have been examined and coded thus far. Data sources already coded include the three just mentioned, as well as the World Value Survey, OECD data, the CIA Factbook, UNICEF, WHO, Save the Children, UNESCO, and other UN reports (such as those on Economic and Social Rights, Civil and Political Rights, etc.), DHS, RHS—to date, over 245 sources have been extracted, and more are being extracted every day. In all these ways, this data set will be unlike any other existing data set on the status of women in the world today.

Our philosophy of data compilation is worth a brief discussion. We are not interested in providing a database that consists solely of numbers. We are also not in a position to adjudicate validity of any individual data source. Our philosophy is that the WomanStats Database will compile existing data from credentialed sources, and the user of the database will bear the responsibility of deciding the parameters of that use. We provide what we call ‘semi-raw’ data, which includes direct quotes from textual sources, statistics when provided, and even qualitative experiential data from the lives of women. We will extract information regardless of the level of measurement precision of that information. We also strive to triangulate data in every instance; that is, we search for multiple data sources for each cell of the database. In this way, we hope to address serious issues of validity that arise when discussing information on the status of women. Our research team has constructed seven indices from information provided in the database, some of which will be analyzed in this paper. However, we feel it is incumbent upon users of the database to create and scale their own indices, as well.
We are pleased to report that the data set already has about 65% of the data inputted, and we are proceeding at a brisk pace. For illustration, at the beginning of 2005, we were only at 20% completion. Our goal is to complete 80% of the data set by the end of calendar year 2007, permitting initial empirical analysis. This year, we will proceed to contact women’s NGOs in the various countries to obtain further country-specific information. In this way, we will be able to triangulate information on our variables, which will help overcome validity and scope problems with any one data source. Country-based organizations will also allow validation of subnational variations noted in more aggregated sources, such as HRAF. After we hit the 80% mark and have cleaned this portion of the data to assure reliability and accuracy, we will upload the data to the Web, where the data will be freely accessible to anyone with an internet connection, thus facilitating worldwide scholarship on these issues. We hope the WomanStats Database will enjoy wide use by scholars in many fields for a long time to come. WomanStats will continue to be maintained and updated in the future, offering the potential for longitudinal analysis of the variables in the database. The creation of this dataset enhances the infrastructure necessary for research, teaching, and learning on this important subject to progress more swiftly.

**WomanStats: Some Preliminary Data**

Thus far from our raw data, we have created two gender clusters from WomanStats and one variable for sex ratios. These variables are discussed below.

**Women’s Physical Security Cluster** – As theory linking women’s equality and state behavior is often based on violence against women, a variable capturing violence against women seems particularly apropos. The WomanStats physical security cluster includes the following variables:

**Domestic Violence**
- Law 1 – Are there laws against domestic violence
- Practice 1 – Are laws against domestic violence enforced?
- Practice 2 – Are there taboos against reporting domestic violence?
- Data 1 – How prevalent is domestic violence?

**Rape**
- Law 1 – Are there laws against rape? Statutory rape and age of consent
- Practice 1 – Are laws against rape enforced?
Practice 2 – Are there taboos against reporting rape?
Data 1 – How prevalent is rape?

Marital Rape
Law 2 – Are there laws against marital rape?
Practice 1 – Are laws against marital rape enforced?
Data 1 – How prevalent is marital rape?

Murder
Data 1 – What is the percentage of women 15-44 murdered?
LRW Practice 3 - Practice of Honor Killings. Can a woman be killed or otherwise punished if she is raped – even if she is obviously innocent?

These indicators of violence against women are combined into a single indicator, Women’s Physical Security, coded as follows:

0 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are enforced; there are no taboos or norms against reporting these crimes, which are rare. There are no honor killings.

1 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are generally enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), which crimes are not common. Honor killings do not occur.

2 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are sporadically enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), which are common. Honor killings do not occur.

3 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, but not necessarily marital rape; these laws are rarely enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), which affect a majority of women. Honor killings may occur among certain segments of society but is not generally accepted.

4 – There are no or weak laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape, and these laws are not generally enforced. Honor killings may occur and are either ignored or generally accepted. (Examples of weak laws—need 4 male witnesses to prove rape, rape is only defined as sex with girls under 12—all other sex is by definition consensual, etc.)
In looking at the rankings for woman’s physical security it is saddening to note that no single country achieved the highest ranking of “women physically secure.” In the second highest category (women have high levels of physical security) 10 of the 11 countries are Western European, with Mauritius being the single outlier (see figure 2). The two lowest categories, in which women have limited or no physical security, are clustered primarily across the Islamic World, Africa, South Asia, the former Communist bloc and most of Latin America. It is interesting to note the Tunisia is a step above the other Arab/Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa and that Guatemala—at the same ranking as the United States—is a rank above its Central America neighbors to the south and two ranks above Mexico to the north. Regional patterns obviously exist, but there are exceptions with some countries being able to rise above the perceived confines of their cultural milieu.
The average Physical Security Cluster score for all states in 2000 is 3.04 (see Table 1 below) – a score that highlights the state of violence, discrimination, and inequality for women around the world.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence Cluster Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 6 4 2 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mean = 3.04**  
**Std. Dev. = 0.889**  
**N = 169**

**Trafficking Cluster** – Trafficking in women is inherently a violent act that undermines women’s human rights. The WomanStats trafficking cluster includes the following variables:

**Trafficking**

- **PRACTICE 1:** Are the laws against it enforced? What reintegration policies do the government implement to assist women removed from prostitution so they will be less likely to become a victim again? (Mary, should we include this coding guide in brackets?)
PRACTICE 2: What are the practices exactly? These could include information regarding brides, prostitutes, ages targeted, presence or lack of deception. Are there class or regional or religious or ethnic differences in practice?

PRACTICE 3: Are victims deported or otherwise punished? See also variable 63

LAW 1: Are there laws against the trafficking of people—especially women and children (include bracketed information?)

LAW 2: Are there laws against engaging in trafficking or using sex slaves in other countries?

LAW 3: Is there governmental support for trafficked women, such as third party hosting of trafficked women who cannot be repatriated?

DATA 1: What is the prevalence of trafficking and/or prostitution?

These indicators of violence against women are combined into a single indicator, Trafficking Cluster, coded as follows:

0 – There are laws against trafficking in the country and into or from other countries. These laws are enforced. The country is in full compliance (ranking of 1) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000. Trafficking appears to be rare.

1 – There are laws against trafficking in the country and into or from other countries. These laws are enforced, but either enforcement is becoming more lax over time or reports of significant trafficking undetected by authorities are increasing. In other words, though a Tier 1 country, there appear to be growing problems. The country is in full compliance (ranking of 1) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000.

2 – There are laws against trafficking in the country. These laws are not always enforced. The country is in non compliance (ranking of 2) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000 but efforts are being made to comply.

3 – There are limited laws against trafficking in the country. The country is in non compliance (ranking of 2) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000 and only limited/marginal efforts are not being made to comply.

4 – There are no laws against trafficking in the country, or from or into the country. The country is not in compliance (ranking of 3) with the Trafficking Persons act of 2000. Victims are not supported in any way. The government may even benefit from and therefore facilitate trafficking.
Figure 3

When it comes to trafficking of females the regional patterns are less pronounced—especially at the lower end of the scale (see figure 3). The lowest ranking where trafficking is not illegal and is widely practiced includes such diverse counties as Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan and Laos along with a single pronounced cluster of countries in the Middle East—minus exceptions such as Lebanon and Jordan. Sweden is the only country to achieve the highest ranking on the trafficking scale with Western Europe, Anglo America, Australia and New Zealand filing out the bulk of the second tier. Notable inclusions in this second tier include: Morocco, Djibouti, Singapore and South Korea.

The average Trafficking Cluster score for all states in 2006 is 2.32 (see Table 2 below). As with the Violence Cluster, this score highlights the state of violence, discrimination, and inequality for women around the world.
Sex Ratio – As with the Violence and Trafficking Clusters, our indicator of sex ratios is also an indicator of violence against women and is the last variable to be considered herein. Sex Ratio is coded as follows:

0 – There is no son preference, and no abnormality in sex ratios, whether those be birth, childhood, or overall sex ratios.

1 – Though a minority of the population expresses son preference, there is no enactment of that preference, so sex ratios are normal.

2 – Though a majority expresses son preference, there is no enactment of that preference, so sex ratios are normal.

3 – There is almost universal son preference in the society, and one sees abnormal sex ratios (Definition: birth 107-109; childhood 105.1-107; (childhood 0-9) OR operator).

4 – There is intense son preference, and there are significant abnormalities in sex ratios, whether those be birth, childhood, or overall sex ratios. (Definition: birth >109, childhood >107; (childhood 0-9) OR operator.)
The low preference and vulnerable status of girls (both before and after birth) in the Sino-Indo realm is well illustrated in the sex ratio rankings and map (see figure 4). Curiously and unexplainably, Catholic Portugal and Muslim Azerbaijan are at the same low rank as several Confucian countries (including Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) and Hindu India. The second to lowest rank includes several Western European countries—notably Spain, Sweden and Switzerland which were among the highest ranked in the two previously discussed rankings. The middle ranking status of the Islamic world in terms of sex ratio is a significant divergence from the two other scales. Iceland and five Caribbean countries are highest rank with the most normal sex ratios and no noted preference for sons.
The average Sex Ratio for all states in 2000 is 2.07 (see Table 3 below). Unlike the Physical Security and Trafficking Clusters, this average indicates a general son preference that does not result in violent behaviors toward women such as female infanticide.

Table 3

![Sex Ratio Distribution]

Discussion

As the distributions and maps visually highlight, individual indicators of women’s equality capture but a piece of the puzzle. We provide a number of interesting correlations that will be further developed separately. Our intent in this essay is to provide additional information for those researching women’s status. The correlations among our Violence and Trafficking Cluster and Sex Ratio Measure are as follows:

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trafficking</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security Cluster</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.510**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking Cluster</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Not only is each measure unique, but also the WomanStats measures capture more than democracy and wealth. The correlations between the WomanStats Clusters and Sex Ratio variable and Democracy (Polity IV) and GDP per capita (World Bank) are as follows:

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>GDP per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>-.457**</td>
<td>-.643**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking Cluster</td>
<td>-.352**</td>
<td>-.499**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>-.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Although violence against women (physical security) is more highly correlated with democracy and with wealth, these correlations are not notably high and drop for both the Trafficking Cluster and remain insignificant with Sex Ratio. These relations bear further explanation, particularly the link between level of development and violence against women.

It is interesting to note that Sex Ratio is not correlated with GDI or any of the three CIRI women’s indices though the WomanStats Physical Security and Trafficking Clusters are correlated, as they should be given their common focus on measuring women’s equality.
Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Security Cluster</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>GDI WCON</th>
<th>CIRI WOPOL</th>
<th>CIRI WOSOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security Cluster</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>GDI WCON</td>
<td>CIRI WOPOL</td>
<td>CIRI WOSOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security Cluster</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>GDI WCON</td>
<td>CIRI WOPOL</td>
<td>CIRI WOSOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security Cluster</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>GDI WCON</td>
<td>CIRI WOPOL</td>
<td>CIRI WOSOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security Cluster</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>GDI WCON</td>
<td>CIRI WOPOL</td>
<td>CIRI WOSOC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Notes: We were unable to obtain the GEM 2000 scores prior to ISA.
The negative correlations are due to the differences in coding – CIRI codes the lowest as the least equality, whereas with the WomanStats Data a score of 0 indicates the highest level of equality.

Of interest is the high correlation, not reported above, between the CIRI Women’s Economic and Women’s Social Measures (.716).

Research on women’s equality is in a nascent stage and our illustrations are designed to spur discussion as to meaningful measures of women’s equality. Scholars need to ensure that they are capturing the appropriate aspect of women’s equality. As our WomanStats measures highlight, the reality of women’s equality is difficult to capture. Indeed, a comparative ranking of these initial WomanStats measures (see Table 7) helps to show that while some countries are quite consistent in their favorable treatment of women (Austria and France have the highest combined rankings) others are not (India and Syria have the lowest combined rankings). Still others are much less predictive (Jamaica, Denmark and Portugal for example). Hopefully this initial foray using WomanStats will be a catalyst to better understanding the varying and complex status of women worldwide.

Table 7 – Ranking States Based on WomanStats Physical Security and Trafficking Clusters and Sex Ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Physical Security</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Trafficking</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Trinidad/Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Spain</td>
<td>1 France</td>
<td>1 Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 Sweden</td>
<td>1 Germany</td>
<td>1 Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 Switzerland</td>
<td>1 Iceland</td>
<td>1 Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Argentina</td>
<td>1 Ireland</td>
<td>1 Djibouti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Austria</td>
<td>1 Italy</td>
<td>1 Estonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Bahamas</td>
<td>1 Lithuania</td>
<td>1 Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Barbados</td>
<td>1 Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Belgium</td>
<td>1 Morocco</td>
<td>1 Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Canada</td>
<td>1 Netherlands</td>
<td>1 Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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